The Global Trade Alert publishes brief reports twice a year. Every GTA report focuses on a new and current topic in international commerce. It presents original research on the topic as well as summaries of the latest updates to the GTA database. To facilitate their targeted reading, the GTA reports are divided into a dozen short chapters with 2-4 pages each.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #52
On the campaign trail, Mr. Trump slammed subsidy-driven approaches to attracting foreign investment in U.S. manufacturing. Putting tariffs on imported goods and saving subsidy outlays was his preference. Since 2017, the United States has seen two regimes for attracting greenfield foreign direct investment. One involved carrots (subsidies) and another involved sticks (import barriers). As this briefing shows, beyond initial sugar highs in 2018 and 2022, neither approach has attracted much foreign capital, nor created many jobs. The contribution of greenfield FDI to any U.S. manufacturing revival has been derisory, notwithstanding a small number of billion plus USD projects that the media often reports. Those projects are not representative of the underlying trend.
Zeitgeist Series Briefing #50
Already certain American trading partners have received tariff threats to their exports, prompting questions as to how best to respond. Drawing on the lessons from the first Trump Administration, statements made by the President-elect and his circle, and the existing pattern of global trade flows, this briefing recommends a hard-headed assessment of goods export exposure and of the expected costs and benefits of negotiating with the next U.S. Administration. Securing existing goods market access is not a realistic negotiating objective.
Zeitgeist Series Briefing #51
Why Bilateral Threats, not a Global Tariff, are the Way Forward
Donald Trump's promise of sweeping tariffs faces two major obstacles: constitutional constraints and congressional politics. These factors, combined with the concentrated nature of U.S. trade patterns, suggest that targeted bilateral actions, not across-the-board tariffs, will dominate early trade policy in the second Trump term.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #48
Crossfire: The U.S. Trade Surplus in Services As America Contemplates An Inward Turn
Although counter-intuitive at first, higher import tariffs on goods can affect the value of cross-border services trade. Since higher U.S. import tariffs won’t change the net saving position of the United States, the current account remains the same. Consequently, if the Trump Administration achieves—even partially—its goal of reducing the U.S. trade deficit in goods, as a matter of accounting this must reduce the U.S. trade surplus in services. Evidence for this proposition can be found during the first U.S.-China Trade War, which halted the inexorable climb in the US trade surplus in services. Trading partners whose bilateral exports to the United States are skewed towards services stand to gain if the next U.S. Administration significantly raises import tariffs.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #49
American Tariff Threats & Foreign Retaliation: No escape from macroeconomic reality
Unfortunately, some trade policymaking operates in a silo sealed off from macroeconomic logic. While some analysts have recently highlighted the constraints that macro relationships play should the U.S. raise import tariffs, I go further. Until American firms, governments and households bring their spending closer into line with their incomes, U.S. tariff increases may depress imports but not to the degree witnessed during the Smoot Hawley era. The same constraints ensure a zero-sum dynamic between foreign retaliation and total goods shipments to the United States---the more U.S. exports get hit by in response, the more U.S. imports must fall.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #47
National support measures for firms in sectors conducive to the net-zero transition are typically justified entirely on national terms. In fact, analysis reveals that subsidy awards and import curbs by one nation typically trigger similar responses from others within 6-24 months. This "echo" effect raises concerns about potential trade conflicts and market access risks, highlighting the need for international alignment and transparency in climate-related industrial policies.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #46
How many swallows make a summer? Sectoral evidence of China’s export recovery
Contrary to reports, evidence from official sources reveals there is no broad-based Chinese surge in exports at the sectoral level. Four out of 98 Chapters (sectors) of the UN Harmonized System of Products each contributed more than 10% to the export growth seen from Q1-Q3 2023 to Q1-Q3 2024. Moreover, by the end of Q3 2024 only 3 of the 20 largest export sectors (Chapters) have seen the total value of their exports exceed prior peaks.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #45
Tariff Scenarios for 2025: Triggers and Fallout for Trade & FDI
Two weeks after the US presidential election, although specifics about the tariff moves of the next US Administration remain unclear, four tariff-related scenarios can be identified that take into account the possible responses of foreign governments and currency market outcomes. These scenarios are outlined here including their triggers and likely consequences for goods trade and FDI flows. Retaliation, should it be deemed necessary, is not a binary choice. There are still pathways to avert a 1930s contraction of world goods trade.
2024 Edition
G20 Trade Policy Factbook 2024
With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the trade and industrial policies of other G20 members will come under even more scrutiny. Our goal is to relate to key trade, industrial and security debates the 6,359 unilateral commercial policy interventions taken by G20 members since Leaders last met that we have recorded.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #43
China’s exports are not accelerating—Beware base year effects
At this critical juncture for world trade, particular care is needed in interpreting monthly Chinese export releases. Atypically low exports in 2023 inflate the 2024 year-on-year percentage increases in monthly Chinese exports. Better to compare the officially released year-to-date export totals, available at present from 2021. These show that Chinese exports have grown in value by 3.2% per annum, hardly a surge. Chinese exports to Japan and USA are currently below levels seen during the first 10 months of 2021; to the EU they have barely risen. Such data undermine the case for raising trade barriers on the grounds that Chinese aggregate exports are “accelerating.”
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #44
Should the next US Administration raise sharply import tariffs on Chinese goods then there is a risk that some Chinese shipments will be deflected to other economies. Voices inside Europe call for pre-emptive increases in import tariffs to forestall such trade deflection. This briefing identifies and scales trade deflection of Chinese products to Europe during the first US-China Trade War. American tariffs can also cause trade retrenchment, where lost sales in the US market cause Chinese firms to benefit from fewer economies of scale and so retreat from EU markets. We show that both effects influenced Chinese exports to the EU during 2018 and 2019. However, the products involved were concentrated in a small number of HS chapters and, as far as the amounts of trade involved, largely offset each other. For the EU the ripple effects of this Trade War were contained.
Tracking information on industrial policies since 1 January 2017
New Industrial Policy Observatory 2.0
With greater focus on the digital and energy transitions, as well as the intensification of geopolitical rivalry, policymakers advocate selective policy intervention more often. Until now there has been no dedicated initiative to track these industrial policy strategies/plans, policies, and awards.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #40
Once again, harsh rhetoric about the alleged practices of trading partners featured prominently during the recent US Presidential election. Based on statements by current and former US officials, this briefing presents evidence from 173 countries of the prevalence of factors that could trigger disputes with the next US Administration. Korea is awarded the maximum of 5 red flags for its “sins”. Four nations including China are awarded 4 red flags and nine customs territories are awarded 3 red flags.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #41
When it comes to trade openness, the US Presidential election confirmed that America is turning inward. Trading partners should assess their exposure to the abrupt loss of goods market access to the United States. This briefing shows that, fortunately, few nations are simultaneously highly export-dependent, concentrate their exports on the US market, and experience stagnant or meagre export growth to third parties. Still, the nations at greatest risk are not confined to America’s neighbours.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #42
Trump’s tariff campaign pledges have gotten headlines—but this US presidential election saw politicians from both parties turn inward, elevating threats to foreign access to the US market. Foreign suppliers are more vulnerable when US sales constitute larger shares of global sales and when non-US sales growth is slower. On this score, foreign suppliers of road vehicles, engines, computer hardware, and medical devices face more downside than counterparts supplying crude oil, pharma products, batteries, telecoms equipment, and semiconductors. Enhanced trade policy risk calls for geographic sales diversification, pursuing new customers.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #39
This briefing analyses the alignment of subsidies with high import dependency goods. It finds that while G7 nations are beginning to allocate more subsidies to sectors reliant on foreign imports, the BRICS+ countries tend to provide more financial support when import dependency originates from a competing bloc. This suggests a Western industrial policy focus on national capacity building rather than supply diversification.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #36
The fading allure of the Chinese behemoth to foreign business
Inflows of foreign direct investment into China shows worrying trends despite its massive economy. While total FDI appears substantial at $163B in 2023, most growth comes from existing foreign subsidiaries rather than new entrants. Foreign manufacturers face declining profitability compared to Chinese peers; the upshot is that most new foreign investment is in service sectors despite Beijing's manufacturing focus. Such findings fuel concerns of Chinese policy favouritism toward domestic firms.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #37
The backlash against this year’s Chinese export “surge”
Despite high-profile Western fears of a Chinese export surge, trade data for the first 8 months of 2024 reveals a nuanced reality. While Chinese exports have grown 4.6%, with sizeable increases in the quantities of steel and vehicles shipped, imports also rose 2.5% in value terms. Underlying these outcomes is a price-driven battle for market share between Chinese firms and rivals from emerging economies in East Asia. Furthermore, only 11.2% of Chinese exports face recent new trade restrictions, suggesting limited international pushback.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #38
Maybe the future of the Internet of Things isn’t global
An important precedent was set last month when Canada and the United States took steps towards banning certain software found in car parts in electric vehicles that were manufactured in China and Russia. The fears raised in this case could be applied to the many connected products associated with the Internet of Things. A key question is whether the car sector is sui generis. If not, then there are significant implications for how and where firms innovate and with which partners. Unwittingly, IoT could become the Achilles Heel of globalisation.
How G20 Members Can Foster Better Practices Through Disclosure, Evaluation & Dialogue
Given the scale of state support for the clean energy transition, fostering relevant
policy disclosure by G20 members is consistent with longstanding G20 priorities of
macro-stability, better governance and the promotion of harmonious international
commercial relations. This policy brief documents the scale of corporate subsidies
associated with the transition, charting their rise as a matter of importance for G20
members individually and systemically.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #35
Industrial policy has seen a revival, with both advanced and emerging economies using targeted interventions to support specific local industries. This analysis examines the economic complexity of industrial policies by country. High-income and Western countries typically implement more complex industrial policies than low-income and non-Western countries. There is a notable alignment between high-income and Western countries and between developing and non-Western countries.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #34
Looking at Industrial Policy through an Economic Complexity Lens: Implications for firms
In the new geopolitical era, companies need to understand the motivations and objectives behind
government-specific industrial subsidies. Recognising domestic priorities allows companies to
align their production with national interests, leading to more informed investment and production
decisions. Financial allocations can eventually distort market competition conditions. Therefore,
learning about different country patterns is crucial for companies to align their strategies with
national interests, improve investment decisions, and evaluate competitive dynamics in local
markets, especially concerning high-tech and low-carbon initiatives.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #33
Which Industrial Policies Target High-End Goods? An Economic Complexity-based Approach
The recent slew of industrial policymaking across the globe is assessed here using scores on product complexity. Selective policy intervention involving public procurement, localisation, and subsidies to local firms typically target more complex products than trade policy interventions. But export restrictions are often applied to more sophisticated goods than import curbs. Industrial policies where the stated motives are linked to national security or competitiveness tend to affect higher-end goods than selective intervention motivated on climate change mitigation or security of supply grounds.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #32
US money talks—but do foreign companies walk?
A July 2024 official report by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis revealed how few foreign firms are willing to establish new production facilities in the United States or to expand existing commercial operations. This is in spite of the Trump and Biden Administrations’ distinct and high-profile attempts to revive US manufacturing. This column explores the root causes of this malaise.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #31
Chinese Car Tariffs Won’t Revitalise Turkey’s Auto Sector
On June 8, 2024, the Turkish government imposed a 40% additional duty on all passenger vehicles
imported from China. The government cited three motivations for this decision: 1) Reverse the
declining share of domestic automobile production. 2) Reduce the current account deficit. 3)
Encourage local investment. Ultimately, these tariffs are unlikely to revive local car production
because Chinese producers can both absorb the tariffs and supply the Turkish market duty free via
production plants in Europe.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #30
De facto, the G7 has become the Situation Room in the West’s pushback against what it sees as the military aggression and economic coercion of others and the threats to its economic and technological primacy. The 14 June 2024 G7 Leaders Statement bears this out. Here the focus is on the implications for trade tensions, highlighting a perceptible hardening in Western position and a regrettable further weakening in the predisposition to follow WTO rules. In turn, this presages further trade disruption and discord.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #29
Redirected Chinese EV Exports: The Chilling Effect of the EU’s Anti-subsidy Investigation
Even before the announcement of possible provisional import duties on Chinese exports of EVs to the European Union, there is evidence that Chinese EV producers are redirecting exports to emerging markets—in particular to Brazil, Kyrgyzstan, and South Korea. Properly measured, China’s share of the fast-growing EU EV market—especially the share supplied by Chinese-owned firms—was never that large.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #28
China's Steel Dominance: Overcapacity & Market Concentration
Chinese steel overcapacity has been a source of trade tensions for many years, triggering the infamous US Section 232 tariffs in 2018. One critical narrative argues that the Chinese supply-demand gap and strong government support is flooding domestic steel markets, particularly in G7 economies. Although evidence supports the existence of this gap and the strong subsidisation of the industry, we argue that the growth of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has absorbed much of China’s steel exports.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #27
Biden's China Tariffs Will Disrupt Global Trade for Green Goods
President Joe Biden's latest installment of the US-China trade war will further disrupt the global market for renewable energy goods. Members of the EU and the Group of 20 are already poised to respond after seeing a surge of cheap Chinese green goods flood their markets in recent years. Absent a coordinated push to avert a broader trade conflict, Biden’s tariffs are likely to trigger a chain reaction across global markets and raise the probability of further fragmentation for the green goods sector. The result will be higher prices and reduced market access for precisely the type of goods that nations need to decarbonize their economies and reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #26
Chinese Trade Retaliation Against Battleground US States
American officials deny that this year’s Presidential election influenced yesterday’s confirmation of import tariff increases by the United States on a range of imported goods from China. Few will buy that. Should Beijing take action against the exports of the battleground states then the jobs at risk in Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin likely exceed one quarter of Biden’s victory margin in 2020.
World Economic Forum White Paper May 2024
Geopolitical Rivalry and Business: 10 Recommendations for Policy Design
In turbulent times, policy-makers and businesspeople are on sharp learning curves. This white paper offers ten recommendations for better design of government policy initiatives. These recommendations suggest how governments can attain geopolitical objectives with the least foregoing of the benefits of globalization.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #25
Scaling Up China's Solar Panel Industry: Surpassing All Expectations
China's photovoltaic (PV) production grew much more than expected in 2023 resulting in a significant excess of domestic supply over domestic demand. Notwithstanding the benefits of a low-cost climate change mitigation technology, there are both commercial as well as political constraints on foreign absorption of Chinese PV supply. Attendant trade tensions are likely to persist as there is little evidence that the mooted shake out of Chinese producers is underway.
Paper prepared for the World Economic Forum
The Costs Of Geopolitical Rivalry For Business: Ten Lessons For Better Policy Design
Existing analyses of the potential for geopolitics to further fragment the world economy do not consider the impact of policy intervention on how firms create value from their international operations or on corporate performance. Nor are the numerous ways internationally-active firms can respond to geopolitics considered. The purpose of this White Paper is to fill in this knowledge gap, drawing upon 13 expert interviews with senior executives from international businesses deliberately selected to cover a range of manufacturing and service sectors. By laying out how international business perceives evolving geopolitical dynamics and their reactions to it, the overall goal of this study is to provide officials with a deeper understanding of associated commercial choices so as to allow them to better advise governments on how to manage cross-border commercial ties going forward.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #24
Turkey Halts Israeli Trade: A Briefing
On 2 May 2024, Turkey suspended all imports from and exports to Israel. This briefing covers several trade-related aspects of the ban, taking account of the bilateral trade flows, possible disruption of transshipments through Turkey to Israel, and the risk of emulation by other nations. That this ban was implemented in the first place is more telling than its likely commercial impact.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #23
Fears of an incipient Chinese export surge are leading some to place too much stock on monthly trade data releases. However, it is important to note that such data is volatile and can be misleading. Using monthly import values and volume data since 2000, I show that double-digit changes in import volumes or import prices happen often in Eurozone, Japanese, and American data. But rarely do import volumes and prices move at the same time in ways consistent with pervasive foreign dumping or subsidisation. In nearly a quarter of century, there is at most one sustained spell consistent with the latter practices (during 2015).
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #22
Trade Barriers Rise in Response to China’s Export Surge
This article examines the rise of Chinese exports for three renewable energy products: Electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels. These export surges are prompting defensive actions – like tariffs and other import barriers – from major economies like the US and EU.
Zeitgeist Series Briefing #21
Governments are considering their best response to the return of overt geopolitical rivalry and, in some cases, lethal conflicts. While some talk of forming formal or informal blocs of like-minded nations, many governments simply don’t want to pick sides. Even those that do can act unilaterally. All the talk of imposing new trade and investment restrictions—often in the name of promoting economic security—may have led officials and analysts to overlook one constructive unilateral option. Namely, strengthening the national and regional business environment so as to enable local firms to adapt to adverse circumstances and opportunities that geopolitical events create. Here the case is made for Intelligent Unilateralism as a (partial) insurance policy against geopolitics.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #20
Chinese Q1 2024 Export Data Offers No Smoking Gun for Over-capacity Debate
The first full set of Chinese trade data for Q1 2024 was released last week. Much commentary linked this release to the narrative gaining traction this year that over-capacity in China’s manufacturing industry is leading to a flood of goods on to world markets. Planks of the economic and competitive logic at the core of the critique of the harm done by Chinese non-market practices are hard to reconcile with last week’s Chinese export data. Future data releases may, of course, be kinder to that critique, but for now the narrative is getting too far ahead of the evidence.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #19
The Green Goods Trade War is in Full Swing
The US, EU and other major economies are quickly raising trade barriers to protect their green goods industries from a surge of cheap Chinese imports. At the same time, these nations are splurging on domestically produced goods to help advance their climate protection goals.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #18
Electric Shock: How China's EV Boom Is Reshaping Global Markets
A surge of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) is overtaking the globe, leaving the world’s top economies scrambling to protect their automotive industries from foreign competition. As the transition to a greener economy accelerates in the coming years, geopolitical tensions are expected to rise as China’s EV exporters continue to pick up market share.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #17
Harvesting Change: The Overlooked Role of the Agri-Food Sector in Climate Policies
The COP28 summit highlights food systems as a central theme, featuring a high-level ministerial meeting and an open “Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action”. Using data from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) and Essential Goods Initiative (EGI) datasets, Fiama Angeles Bonelli notes that, despite its significant contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, the agri-food sector is receiving diminished attention in the latest wave of climate change mitigation policies.
WTO COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, VOLUME 2
LDCs and the multilateral trading system
Simon J. Evenett analyses the factors responsible for the stalled LDC integration into global markets. The essay is part of the World Trade Organization's LDCs and the multilateral trading system report.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #16
Steel and aluminium imports into the EU and the US: A factual briefing as GSA talks intensify
The EU and the US are currently negotiating a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium” (GSA) to "address carbon intensity and global overcapacity." In an era of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, some champion what they see as innovative sectoral approaches. Using the latest global trade data for these products, in this factual briefing note Simon Evenett and Fernando Martin assess the leverage such transatlantic action is likely to generate, in particular over Chinese producers.
Journal of International Business Policy (2023)
Geopolitics, conflict, and decoupling: evidence of Western divestment from Russia during 2022
How foreign firms doing business in Russia responded to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has received extensive media scrutiny. Publication lags in official and private databases on international corporate activity, traditionally used to investigate cross-national commercial ties, preclude short-term assessments of foreign firms’ responses. However, as geopolitical events unfold quickly, such assessments can offer valuable insights. In this paper, we advocate for and implement a replicable, near-time methodology that is executed at armslength to track foreign corporate responses to geopolitical events which can inform both academic debate and policy deliberation. We apply it to the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict, estimating Western corporate divestment rates from Russia during the first 9 months of the conflict.
Our findings, confirmed by extensive robustness checks, result in divestment rates in the range of 5–13%. This range is interpreted in light of the prevailing sanctions regime as well as the divestment rate witnessed after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. We also discuss the competing, often policy-induced, incentives facing international business during a time of growing geopolitical rivalry and draw implications for the design of sanctions regimes. Avenues for future research are also outlined.
Asian Economic Policy Review
Can the World Trade Organization Act as a Bulwark Against Deglobalization?
Whether existing multilateral trade commitments really deter larger trading nations from taking steps that further weaken cross-border commercial ties is assessed here. Evidence from salient commercial policy episodes of recent years is combined with information on the actual leeway available to G-20 members under extant World Trade Organization rules. The upshot is a bleak assessment of the capacity of the existing multilateral trade rule book to rein in any attempt by larger trading nations to “deglobalize” the world economy.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #15
Despite region-wide oversight, European governments routinely award billions of euros of state aid. Their exporters in five HS chapters are potential targets of anti-subsidy investigations, should China decide to retaliate against the recently announced EU investigation of its electric vehicle exports. Each of these HS chapters involves more than $5bn in exports to China in subsidised product lines.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #14
In recent years EV producers in China, both Chinese and foreign, faced different policy-induced incentives to export to the EU. Singling out Chinese subsidies to EV producers is sophistic.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #13
China is not alone in seeing its exports of EVs multiply since 2017. The growing propensity of EU citizens to buy Chinese EVs has not come at the expense of sourcing from Germany and Spain.
2023 Edition
G20 Trade Policy Factbook 2023
The G20 has long ceased being an effective vehicle for aligning the trade policies of the world's largest economies. Still, each G20 Leaders Summit provides the opportunity to lay out the facts on contemporary trade policy dynamics, drawing upon the thousands of policy interventions documented by the Global Trade Alert team since G20 Leaders met in Bali.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #12
China, Commodities & the Rest of the BRICS
The workshop of the world needs lots of commodities and over the past two decades China has subtly managed its sourcing of these items from the rest of the BRICS.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #11
On trade & industrial policy mix the BRICS group are different
Just because the BRICS haven’t formed a traditional trade bloc doesn’t mean that their commercial policy mix is similar to the rest of the world. Subsidies to local firms play a bigger role and export restrictions rely more on potentially opaque licensing regimes and taxes than bans.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #9
Are the IRA climate-related tax credits a trillion-dollar problem?
Last week, once again, senior European policymakers cherrypicked large estimates of IRA subsidies to make the case for relaxing EU subsidy disciplines. Interested observers may be baffled by the range of IRA costings being reported. Simon Evenett teamed up with leading US trade and tax policy expert, Gary C. Hufbauer, to prepare a short guide that puts the "big numbers" in perspective.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #10
Notes on India’s July 2023 ban on the exports of certain types of rice
Though the rationale for India’s July 2023 decision to ban exports of non-basmati rice was distinct from Russia’s abandonment of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the consequences for global food prices and insecurity are inter-related.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #8
Last week’s little noticed US data release on FDI inflows for 2022 casts doubt on claims that European firms moved quickly to redirect investment across the Atlantic in the months since the enactment of the CHIPS Act and the IRA. In fact, European firms reduced their planned expenditures on greenfield investments from a 2021 high of $20.5bn to just $5bn in 2022. American inducements have yet to reverse the decade-long trend decline in EU greenfield investments in the United States.
THE 31ST GLOBAL TRADE ALERT REPORT
The Scramble for Critical Raw Materials: Time to Take Stock?
For over a decade the scramble for so-called Critical Raw Materials has been a flashpoint between nations. Accusations and fears that governments weaponise trade in these industrial materials abound. Given the central role they play in the digital and energy transitions, policies to secure and produce these materials have the potential to upset trade relations for decades to come. Faced with this unwelcome prospect, Johannes Fritz and Simon Evenett devoted the 31st Global Trade Alert report to sort out the fact from fiction in this complex, long-term policy challenge.
As the Executive Summary makes clear, many of the narratives deployed by governments simply don’t stand up to scrutiny—which surprised us. Just two of many examples: The poster child for weaponising Rare Earths trade can’t be found in the finest-grained UN trade data. Nor is the track record of the leading emerging market industrial policy “success” (Indonesia’s nickel ore export ban) quite what it seems. We present evidence on what governments steps are actually taking towards Critical Raw Materials and assess them. We don’t counsel despair. Instead, we lay out five steps that would “thicken” markets over time for the small number of industrial materials where major excess demand gaps are likely to emerge in the decades ahead.
COMMERCIAL POLICY DATASET SERIES BRIEFING 1
Corporate Subsidy Inventory 2.1
This inventory contains information on corporate subsidies awarded and changes in corporate subsidy policies by 148 customs territories since 1 November 2008. This inventory was published in May 2023 and follows the release of our first inventory in October 2021. Access to this dataset is available on our Data & Methods page.
COMMERCIAL POLICY DATASET SERIES BRIEFING #2
Δ Market Access Database 1.0 (ΔMAD v1.0)
This database contains estimates of the change (hence the Δ) in the shares of a jurisdiction’s imports that are covered by trade distortions implemented by the importing nation and by third-party governments. Taking 1 November 2008 as the starting point, the estimates available refer to the change in goods imports covered by trade distortions for each year from 2009 to 2023. Estimates are provided for 243 customs territories, with information provided for certain regional trade agreements.
Third cBrief with the University of California-San Diego Globalization and Prosperity Lab
Weaponizing Wheat: Moscow’s Menace to Food Security in 2023
Food insecurity was top-of-mind throughout 2022. What about 2023? There is no end in sight to the armed conflict in Ukraine. Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation were major suppliers of wheat to world market before the invasion. What’s at stake if Moscow seeks to weaponize wheat exports during 2023? Using reputable, December 2022 forecasts for wheat harvests during the 2022/23 season, this cBrief presents evidence on Russia's incentive to use three different tools to weaponise international trade in wheat and their likely consequences for the price and volume of wheat shipped to food-importing nations.
The 30th Global Trade Alert Report
Must Do Better: Trade & Industrial Policy and the SDGs
Many governments reckon their trade policies promote environmental improvements, the clean energy transition, improved conditions for workers, and other aspects of sustainable development. Yet many critics and promoters of trade reform pour cold water on the notion that commercial policy should target the Sustainable Development Goals.
To take this discussion forward, the Global Trade Alert team has prepared a factual assessment of what commercial policy has contributed to the SDGs since the Agenda 2030 came into effect in 2016 and how much more it could contribute from here on. Also, we tackle head-on the apparenttension between openness and advancing SDGs and put forward suggestions to resolve it.
FORTHCOMING IN INTERECONOMICS
What Endgame for the Deglobalisation Narrative?
Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic it has become fashionable in some quarters to argue that
the world is deglobalising or should do so. Advocates of this position are much clearer about the
perceived deficiencies of the status quo than they are about the endgame of deglobalisation.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #7
Deep Pockets, Revising EU State Aid Rules and The Single Market
As European Commission officials signal a further relaxation of State Aid rules, concerns have been
raised by European Council President, Mr. Charles Michel, that not every Member State can afford to be
as generous as those with deep pockets. Evidence from EU subsidies to energy-intensive industries
reported here suggests that Mr. Michel is right to worry.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #5
What makes “critical materials” critical?
Governments across the world are issuing strategies to secure access to “critical materials” (CM). This briefing looks at the latest CM lists published by fourteen different jurisdictions and analyses the logics employed to consider a material critical.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #6
What policies have governments adopted to secure critical materials?
Fear of supply chain disruption has led governments to adopt a range of policies to secure access to critical materials, including awarding state aid and foreign direct investment measures. This briefing describes several high-profile national policies adopted in recent years by eight jurisdictions to secure access to critical minerals.
ZEITGEIST SERIES BRIEFING #4
Will the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act “Hoover up” European Investment?
Certain European ministers contend that the $369 billion of fiscal incentives created by the U.S.
Inflation Reduction Act will divert much needed investment in Europe across the Atlantic. A review
of the facts suggest that such fears are almost certainly overblown and should not be used to
rationalise EU counter-subsidies and a mooted Buy European Act.
2022 Edition
G20 Trade Policy Factbook November 2022
“What gets measured gets managed” is Peter Drucker’s famous dictum for making progress. Since we want globalisation to be better managed for the benefit of all, the Global Trade Alert team has developed new ways to document those policy interventions that affect cross-border commerce. We are committed to democratising access to such information so that more effective policies can be identified through analysis, with the ultimate goal of strengthening the role of international trade as an engine for human development in the decades to come. The release of the first edition of our G20 Trade Policy Factbook is another step towards that goal.
Zeitgeist Series Briefing #1
What do the Friends of Friend-shoring Think Its Rationale Is?
Senior US policymakers are advocating friend-shoring—but they haven’t been consistent in the use
of that term. Nor have they explained why private sector incentives to blunt supply chain disruption
aren’t strong enough.
Zeitgeist Series Briefing #2
What Policy Initiatives Advance Friend-Shoring?
Although the spotlight in recent weeks has been on policy developments in the United States, other
nations have taken initiatives that smack of friend-shoring. This briefing describes the state of play
as of August 2022.
Zeitgeist Series Briefing #3
Friend-shoring is now part of the trade policy Zeitgeist. Advocates expect supply chain pay-offs and
enhanced resilience. However, the measures taken to date are not well designed because they focus on one set of risks and the carrots offered aren’t sufficient.
A Joint Report of the Digital Policy Alert and Global Trade Alert
Emergent Digital Fragmentation: The Perils of Unilateralism
Policymakers are flying blind as they shape and nurture the digital domain. The last
inventory of government intervention affecting this critical vehicle for opportunity
and growth was published four years ago. Much has happened since. No official
institution has a global mandate to track policy intervention in the digital domain.
Nothing good comes of this evidence gap. Officials learn less from the prior choices
of peers. Patchy information reinforces the tendency of officials to retreat into silos,
resulting in state initiatives that don’t take into account the complexities of an evolving,
multi-faceted digital domain which exists in a world with extensive cross-border ties.
Accountability is diminished too.
This report fills in the evidence gap. It adopts a comprehensive view of both the
economic activities associated with the digital domain and the policies affecting the
digital domain and their cross-border repercussions. Drawing upon two extensive
inventories of public policy intervention, the Digital Policy Alert and the Global Trade
Alert, this report delineates the global policy landscape towards the digital domain
with a focus on the G20 nations and members of the European Union.
Correcting Misleading Empirical Evidence and Other Errors About the Moratorium on Customs Duties on Electronic Transmissions
This note corrects a number of misleading and incorrect claims found in a South Centre paper that was circulated to trade diplomats immediately before the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO.
A White Paper published by the World Economic Forum
Conflict, Sanctions and the Future of World Trade
Heightened geopolitical tensions raise questions about the consequences for the global trading
system. Five scenarios have been identified and explored in this paper for the benefit of business
and government leaders navigating an increasingly uncertain landscape.
This White Paper was published by the World Economic Forum in advance of its 2022 Annual Meeting in May 2022.
Second CBRIEF WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SAN DIEGO
Isolating the Russian Economy: The overlooked role of international shipping costs
Just one-quarter of World Trade Organization (WTO) members, a total of 40 governments, have
moved to impose additional tariffs on Russian exports following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine—an
outcome that limits the punishment metered out to the Russian economy. This cBrief draws upon the
precedent of medium-term sanctions on the Apartheid regime in South Africa, where a combination
of trade and investment sanctions as well as elevated international transport costs isolated that
nation’s economy. We present evidence that sustained, modest increases in shipping costs reduce
Russian GDP more over the medium-term than G7 and EU Member States imposing heavy tariffs on
Russian exports. Strategies to isolate the Russian economy therefore need to keep the global shipping
giants onside.
Benchmarking the 2022 NTE report
The state of digital trade barriers and internet fragmentation
We compare the findings of the Digital Policy Alert with those of the latest USTR's National Trade Estimate Report to identify fragmentation risks for the digital economy.
Paper prepared for the World Trade Forum 2021 dedicated to analysing 20 years of China's WTO membership
The post-accession treatment of Chinese goods exports by WTO Members
The extent to which Chinese goods exports faced unilateral trade policy changes taken by other WTO members is documented here and decomposed between those policy changes that specifically target China and those that do not. Chinese goods exposure to measures taken by the European Union, the United States, China’s regional partners, and those taken worldwide are also contrasted, in terms of scale, discriminatory or liberalising treatment, as well as timing. The degree to which China’s WTO membership protected its goods exports from worse competitive conditions since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis is assessed and found wanting.
Form, Frequency, Duration & Scale
COVID-era Trade Policy Interventions Affecting Medical Goods
Drawing upon the findings of several trade policy surveillance initiatives, an account is presented here of government resort to trade restrictions and reforms affecting medical goods during the COVID-19 pandemic. Some nations mustered effective public health responses early in the pandemic without resorting to trade restrictions. Some other governments quickly reversed export restrictions once their adverse side effects became evident. However, another group of nations have removed COVID-19 trade restrictions very slowly, if they removed them at all. These findings challenge the assumption that existing multilateral rules effectively regulate the crisis-era application of general exceptions to non-discrimination norms for goods trade. While the logic of those exceptions is to prevent multilateral trade obligations impeding public health responses, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that these flawed rules on exceptions have attenuated the contribution of cross-border trade to pandemic response, in particular in those developing countries that source much medical goods from abroad.
First cBrief with the University of California-San Diego
Making Moscow Pay: How much extra bite will G7 & EU trade sanctions have?
Following the revocation of MFN treatment of Russian goods, the members of the G7 and European Union (EU27) can raise import tariffs sharply. We outline three trade sanction scenarios in this computation-based brief and report their predicted effects on Russian GDP, on bilateral exports, and on Russian job losses. Once the Russian economy has adjusted, the most severe trade sanction scenario is expected to result in a permanent GDP reduction of 1.06%, in bilateral Russian exports to the G7 and EU27 nations falling by 70.9%, and in 522,000 job losses from the Russian energy sector. Losses on this scale for Russia amount to a third of the estimated GDP gain from its WTO accession. The same scenario is estimated to result in 206,000 job losses in the G7 and EU27 and to reduce their joint GDP by 0.06% permanently.
The Case of Ukraine Since the Annexation of Crimea
While potential military developments—including steps that reinforce Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself—may be decisive in the days ahead, the capacity of Ukraine to strengthen its armed forces over the medium term depended on its access to foreign markets in part. In this note, evidence is presented that casts doubt on the extent to which EU, UK, and US commercial policies have supported Ukrainian export growth since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These findings speak to the longstanding cornerstone of the world trading system that international trade and peace are inextricably linked--in this case, short-sighted unilateral policy decisions by the West may have undercut broader diplomatic objectives of shoring up Ukraine and deterring war.
E-Commerce Moratorium & the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference
This note vitiates assertions by UNCTAD staff that developing countries have lost significant government revenues as products previously delivered physically are supplied digitally. Taking for the sake of argument UNCTAD’s revenue loss estimates, this note shows that they represent small shares of tax revenues from sources other than customs duties. Forgone revenues would have financed less than 5 days of government spending in the Least Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan African nations. Moreover, domestic tax takes needed only to grow marginally faster to offset UNCTAD’s estimates of forgone customs duties. Low per-capita income status is not a barrier to successful national tax reform, calling in question the relevance of public finance objections to participation in multilateral trade initiatives to integrate economies.
SUBSIDIES & MARKET ACCESS: TOWARDS AN INVENTORY OF SUBSIDIES BY CHINA, THE EU & THE USA
The 28th Global Trade Alert Report
The 28th Global Trade Alert Report will be published on 25 October 2021 in advance of the G20 Leaders Summit in Rome. In addition to our traditional reporting on the policy interventions undertaken by G20 members, this report will have a special focus on the subsidies awarded by China, the European Union, and the United States since the Global Financial Crisis.
Evidence from the G20 members during 2020
Must An Effective Activist State Harm Trading Partners?
A longstanding presumption in trade policy circles is that governments should be afforded significant discretion in responding to crises. Even so, it is recognised in the declarations of many international summits and elsewhere that there should be limits to the extent to which external stability is jettisoned in the pursuit of internal stability. This chapter presents evidence that the frequency of cross-border harm inflicted by G20 members varied considerably in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. G20 policy choice differed along a number of other critical dimensions too. Such evidence begs the question posed in the title of this chapter; the tension between internal and external stability may be more apparent than real. Technocratic work to identify trade-friendly crisis response packages should commence, providing a robust factual basis for discussions between WTO members once the COVID-19 pandemic is behind us.
THE 27TH GLOBAL TRADE ALERT REPORT
Advancing Sustainable Development With FDI: Why Policy Must Be Reset
Sharp reductions in FDI inflows have occurred since the onset of the pandemic. The reality is that FDI was in trouble long before. This comes at a time when governments and civil society are demanding that international business play a greater role in addressing pressing global challenges, such as advancing sustainable development and the transition to a low carbon economy. The 27th Global Trade Alert report shows that these demands are being made when financial returns on FDI in all but one emerging market region are barely above those earned in safer industrial country markets. Moreover, the report shows that since 2015 government policies have become less conducive to FDI, a finding not confined to any one group of host nations. The report contends that if multinational enterprises are to play a greater role then policy needs to be reset to restore the commercial viability of FDI. The report's findings have implications for national development policies, for deliberations on implementing the Sustainable Development Goals, for the financing of FDI, and for the negotiation on investment accords.
Policy Note circulated by The European Money and Finance Forum
What Caused the Resurgence in FDI Screening?
Since 2019 at least 30 governments have introduced or strengthened policies that screen foreign investments ostensibly on national security grounds. That 28 such policy changes occurred after 31 December 2019 led some to posit a link to the COVID-19 pandemic. While the pandemic was an important aggravating factor, the spread of digital general-purpose technologies and growing geopolitical rivalry are enduring factors that account for the greater resort to FDI screening. Consequently, few of the recently restrictive policy changes
are likely to be reversed; a permanent shift in the treatment of foreign investors is underway.
Thought leadership with Airfinty
How Much Vaccine Will Be Produced This Year?
The private sector is ramping up fast COVID-19 vaccine production, thereby narrowing the gap between vaccine supply and demand. The purpose of this note is to report the latest estimates of how much of the vaccine shortage will be eliminated this year, given what is known today about existing vaccine production capacity, announced capacity expansion this year, and sobering lessons learned from attempts to boost production during the first five months of this year. The projections reported here do not include any extra production that might result from the adoption of a TRIPS waiver at the World Trade Organization.
Thought leadership with Airfinty
How Much Surplus Vaccine Will the U.S. Have?
The scaling up of COVID-19 vaccine production in the United States is impressive. Depending
on the decisions taken by the Biden Administration in the weeks ahead, surpluses of vaccines
could soon arise. This note presents estimates of the size of that surplus under different
scenarios, each reflecting a distinct policy choice by the White House.
Arguments for an attribute-based approach
Mapping Policies Affecting Digital Trade
The purpose of this paper is to ask and answer foundational questions concerning the collection of meaningful information about policy stance towards digital trade.
Thought leadership with Airfinty
Halting India’s Vaccine Exports: The Fallout
The world--in particular, the developing world--is counting on India to supply them with COVID-19 vaccines. During March 2021 Indian exports of such vaccines collapsed and GAVI noted that shipments in March and April 2021 were likely to be delayed. On 7 April 2021 the CEO of the Serum Institute of India said that shipments might be resumed in June 2021 so long as local Indian needs were met first. In this analysis, the delays to vaccination programmes in Africa, in Asia, and in Latin America and the Carribean are estimated should India cease exports.
A Chatham House Briefing Paper
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the fore concerns about shortages of medical goods, including vaccines, and about the risks associated with competition for supplies. Policymakers to date have often advocated ill-conceived approaches that misunderstand the dynamics of relevant supply chains.
International mechanisms have a role in supporting properly devised national initiatives to ensure resilient supplies in times of crisis. To this end, this paper proposes a three-part framework for policy coordination, consisting of:
— Promotion of effective public health responses, including early intervention in emergencies and potential domestic rationing of key supplies.
— Specific national measures for medical goods, including revised rules on domestic and overseas procurement, de-risking of supply chains, and ‘trade facilitation plans’ to suspend tariffs and taxes and fast-track port clearances.
— A confidence-building MoU to codify key principles. Signatories would commit to joint-purchasing arrangements and data sharing on medical goods stockpiles. Swap arrangements for stockpiles should also be agreed. The MoU could be presented for adoption at the G7 summit in June 2021. It could also form the basis for a wider agreement to be announced on the sidelines of the 2021 UN General Assembly.
A World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
The Covid-19 Vaccine Production Club: Will Value Chains Temper Nationalism?
In the first two months of 2021, the production of COVID-19 vaccines has suffered setbacks delaying the implementation of national inoculation strategies. These delays have revealed the concentration of vaccine manufacture in a small club of producer nations, which in turn has implications for the degree to which cross-border value chains can deter more aggressive forms of Vaccine Nationalism, such as export curbs. This paper documents the existence of this club, taking account of not just the production of final vaccines but also the ingredients of and items needed to manufacture and distribute COVID-19 vaccines. During 2017-19, vaccine producing nations sourced 88% of their key vaccine ingredients from other vaccine producing trading partners. Combined with the growing number of mutations of COVID-19 and the realization that this coronavirus is likely to become a permanent endemic global health threat, this finding calls for a rethink of the policy calculus towards ramping up the production and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, its ingredients, and the various items needed to deliver them. The more approved vaccines that are safely produced, the smaller will be the temptation to succumb to zero-sum Vaccine Nationalism.
Published in the World Trade Review
Economic Statecraft: Is There a Sub-National Dimension? Evidence from United States-China Rivalry
Using detailed information on policy interventions by US sub-national governments between 2009 and
2019, the contribution of such public bodies to Sino-US geopolitical rivalry is examined, in particular since President Trump took office in 2017. While US sub-national governments accounted for 28% of all US policy interventions that harmed Chinese commercial interests, awarding firm-specific subsidies in 88% of cases, the timing and sectoral incidence of such intervention suggests that economic statecraft considerations could only be part of the explanation for their actions. Ironically, the interventions of US sub-national governments and their weak commitment to transparency have much in common with their frequently maligned Chinese counterparts.
Published in the Journal of International Economic Law
The Smoot-Hawley Fixation: Putting the Sino-US Trade War in Contemporary and Historical Perspective
The extent to which the Sino-US trade war represents a break from the past is examined in this published paper. This ongoing trade war is benchmarked empirically against the Smoot-Hawley tariff increase and against the sustained, covert discrimination by governments against foreign commercial interests witnessed since the start of the global economic crisis. The Sino-US trade war is not the defining moment that some contend. Thus, laying the blame for the current woes of global trade entirely at the feet of policymakers in Beijing or Washington, D.C., is unfounded. Since the rot started well before 2018 and implicates many states, greater attention should be given to the factors determining the unilateral commercial policies of governments during and after systemic economic crisis. The insights presented here from the economic history literature of the 1930s presented here are useful in this regard. Moreover, claims that existing multilateral trade rules have bite are hard to square with the very large shares of global trade affected by policy measures favouring local firms implemented over the past decade. When confronted with severe adverse economic conditions for better or for worse, WTO members had plenty of policy space after all.
Book chapter
The Trade & Government Procurement Policy Nexus: Before and After The COVID-19 Pandemic
Nine months into the COVID-19 pandemic the purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the implications of this stress test for the trade and government procurement nexus. Drawing on data collected on government policy response and on the recent analyses of others, this chapter will ask whether current arrangements and practices are fit for purpose. If not, why not? Do any deficiencies reflect lacunae, blind spots, or implicit assumptions that turned out to be false? Perhaps any failings reflect the fact that the extant nexus was not designed to cope with pandemics in the first place?
Has the EU Opened Pandora’s Box?
Export Controls on COVID-19 Vaccines
Will the EU's trading partners be reassured by the new export regime on COVID-19 vaccines? If not, what could they do about it? And, could this spiral out of control? For five scenarios going forward, see our briefing.
The 26th Global Trade Alert report
Collateral Damage: Cross-Border Fallout from Pandemic Policy Overdrive
This report provides the most comprehensive account to date of the cross-border commercial fallout from government measures taken to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. Information on 2,031 policy interventions taken during the first 10 months of 2020 was analysed in the preparation of this report. For sure, not every element of pandemic response had consequences for trading partners. Of those that did, three-quarters were harmful. Major findings are presented in the Executive Summary. Given the improved prospects for a revival in multilateral trade cooperation, we make three policy recommendations.
Pragmatic Ideas for a New WTO Director-General
In the midst of profound contemporary shifts and shocks facing humankind, a quarter of a century after its creation the World Trade Organization (WTO) is evidently not where pressing trade problems are being solved. Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a lens, the purpose of this volume is to offer insights into the underlying choices faced by WTO members as well as to offer pragmatic suggestions for a WTO work programme over the next three years.
ARTICLE IN THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS POLICY
Chinese whispers: COVID-19, global supply chains in essential goods, and public policy
If taken at their word, senior policymakers in the major economic powers have drawn adverse conclusions concerning the performance of cross-border supply chains during the first 6 months of the COVID-19 pandemic. That such supply chains often implicate China, the origin of the pandemic, has also led to claims that trading partners have become too dependent on Chinese supplies. This in turn has led to policy interventions designed to reconfigure supply chains, which if adopted broadly could revise the terms upon which international business operates. A critical evaluation of this policymaker assessment is presented, based on near-time monitoring of medical and food trade disruption induced by government policy, on fine-grained trade data on the pre-pandemic international sourcing patterns of medical goods and medicines by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, on statements from U.S. government health experts before and during the pandemic on the frequency and sources of medicine shortages, and on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s latest evidence on the causes of medicine shortages in 2020. Such evidence vitiates the adverse conclusions mentioned above, but raises important questions about the factors that determine policy towards international business during a time of intensifying geopolitical rivalry.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is at an impasse regarding the resolution of tensions surrounding the issue of subsidies. The weak implementation and surveillance of WTO disciplines is attributable to the lack of notifications by WTO members. Currently, major members are developing plurilateral initiatives to deal with the perceived unfair application of subsidies, which leads to market distortions, overcapacity, and unfair competition. Are these steps an attempt at broad reform or a self-serving agenda aimed at certain other members? This policy brief explores the major issues around subsidies, and identifies a plurilateral path forward if a broad—than member-targeted—reform agenda is to be followed. It proposes procedural steps that the Group of Twenty (G20) members can follow to address the subsidies problem and, thus, provides a set of substantive options to guide the proposed deliberations.
A Global Trade Alert analysis for the Commonwealth Secretariat
Exports at Risk from Non-Tariff Measures: The Experience of Commonwealth Countries
This study breaks new ground by combining three substantial databases of commercial policy change over the past decade to compute the shares of Commonwealth exports at risk from adverse policy changes and reforms by trading partners. The calculations undertaken for this study use the finest-grain trade data available globally, and the conservative methods employed imply that the resulting estimates almost certainly understate the scale of the threat to living standards. The study demonstrates that larger shares of Commonwealth member countries’ exports have been exposed to changes in other policies, undertaken by their trading partners, that have tilted the commercial playing field towards favoured, local firms.
A Global Trade Alert analysis for the VDMA
Impediments to German Mechanical Engineering Exports
This analysis identifies where foreign trade distortions put at risk significant shares of the exports of the German mechanical engineering sector. Although initiated before the COVID-19 pandemic, by focusing on the policies holding back German mechanical engineering exports at the beginning of 2020, this study provides a benchmark against which pandemic-era policies affecting trade can be judged. This study goes beyond traditional import restrictions, such as tariffs and anti-dumping duties and takes account of subsidies to import-competing firms, export incentives provided by foreign governments to their firms selling into third markets, as well as new regulations that may become barriers to trade. Estimates of the percentage of German mechanical engineering exports facing each of these policies in every foreign trading partner have been calculated too.
THE ESSENTIAL GOODS INITIATIVE+ (April 2024)
Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the initial purpose of this initiative was to collect information on changes in trade and investment policies related to medical and food products. Information on such policy changes was processed, collated, and then shared on a monthly basis.
Since April 2022, the monitoring initiative was expanded to include global value chain inputs, raw materials, feed, fertiliser and fuel following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Our inventory of policy intervention indicates where state action has been linked to the conflict. Since January 2023, the scope was expanded further to include critical raw materials and related downstream manufactured goods (hence the + in EGI+). Additionally, the inventory also records the stated motive of the implementing government, where available.
Maps and charts are now issued quarterly summarising key features of commercial policy stance. The maps, charts, underlying inventory, and a methodology note can be downloaded in the winzip file. Additionally, a digest of policy developments is issued quarterly.
A VoxEU eBook
COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won’t Work
World trade will soon collapse largely as a result of governments’ battle against the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Conventional wisdom has it that economic recessions are the handmaiden of protectionism. Should governments turn inward and further weaken cross-border commercial ties? The contributors to this eBook assess pandemic-era trade policy developments, reference precedent cases, and provide an unequivocal answer: No.
A Trade Bargain to Secure Supplies of Medical Goods
Preparing for a Second Wave of COVID-19
The recent free-for-all witnessed in trade policymaking on medical goods has had an unintended consequence—paradoxically, it may have laid the foundations for a bargain between importing and exporting nations. In this paper, Simon Evenett and Alan Winters describe the underlying commercial logic of this bargain, its elements, and their WTO compatibility. Critically, the bargain does not require global participation or endless trade talks. Done right there would be a market penalty for manufacturers in exporting nations whose governments choose to free ride on this arrangement. The paper also discusses this proposal in relation to other recent joint trade policy initiatives in this critical area of world trade.
The past fortnight has witnessed a sharp increase in zero-sum, unilateral trade policy acts as governments scramble for medical supplies and equipment. During a pandemic such zero-sum behaviour risks inflicting an unconscionable human toll, as a case study on medical ventilators in this note makes clear. Rather than dwell exclusively on negative developments in this note, the case is also made for a bottom-up, cooperative trade policy initiative in which governments working together can exploit scale and ensure that trade policy does not diminish the payoff from public health interventions.
The Trade Policy Dimension
Protective medical equipment (such as masks), medicines, disinfectant, and soap are needed to tackle the Coronavirus. Many countries source these medical supplies from abroad and so trade policy stance becomes part of national policy responses to the Coronavirus. Using information on policy developments through to 10 March 2020, this note presents a global picture on the resort to export and import restrictions on these much needed medical supplies. The likely effects of these restrictions are discussed along with their coherence with the medical responses to the Coronavirus. The note describes how trade policy can make a positive contribution to this important societal threat and five specific policy recommendations are advanced.
The 25th Global Trade Alert Report
Going It Alone? Trade policy after Three Years of Populism
The populist and nationalist turn in many nations’ politics has sharpened the rhetoric towards globalisation. But did this translate into changes on the ground in trade, investment, and migration policies? This report examines whether a worldwide shift away from the level commercial playing field is underway or whether turns inward are localised. Unlike many reports by international organisations, which tend to focus on six-month reporting cycles, the evaluation here covers the entire, recent Populist era.
The 24th Global Trade Alert Report
Jaw Jaw not War War: Prioritising WTO Reform Options
G20 Leaders are due to discuss options to revive the moribund WTO at the upcoming Osaka Summit. The purpose of this Global Trade Alert report is to identify WTO reform options that directly address the first-order problems that have built up over the past decade. Our approach ties prescription to diagnosis.
Article in the Journal of International Business Policy
The manner and extent of state discrimination against international business since the start of the Global Financial Crisis is documented and interpreted. Without resorting to 1930s-style across-the-board tariff increases, governments have tilted the playing field in favor of local firms so often since November 2008 that 70% of the world’s goods exports competed against crisis-era trade distortions by 2013. Export mercantilism and other forms of selective subsidization are persistent features of crisis-era policy response. Available evidence also casts doubt on the notion that foreign direct investments have been treated as well as successive World Investment Reports contend.
THE 23RD GLOBAL TRADE ALERT REPORT
Brazen Unilateralism: The US-China Tariff War in Perspective
The polite fiction of G20 compliance with its protectionist pledge became untenable with the implementation of the Trump Administration’s America First policy. The ongoing Sino-US tariff war is a consequence and casts a pall over this year’s G20 Leaders’ Summit. The meeting expected between Presidents Trump and Xi may indicate whether trade frictions deteriorate further. Rather than speculate this report puts the Sino-US tariff war in perspective, assessing the scale and impact of American brazen unilateralism. We matched up detailed data on trade policy changes worldwide with monthly trade data, drew upon insights from 17 recent analyses of contemporary trade wars, and extracted lessons for today’s trade turmoil from the 1980s and 1990s US approach of Aggressive Unilateralism towards its trading partners.
THE 22ND GLOBAL TRADE ALERT REPORT
Going Spare: Steel, Excess Capacity, and Protectionism
During the past year some of America’s trading partners have sought to rein in Washington’s unilateral protectionist instincts by framing the woes of the trading system in terms of global excess capacity—essentially diplomatic code for Chinese excess capacity in manufactures. The joint EU, Japanese, and US statement pledging cooperation on such matters at last December’s WTO Ministerial Conference was an important milestone in this co-option strategy. In light of the threatened imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminium products on widely-derided national security grounds, this report examines whether America’s trading partners should double down on this particular strategy. To do so, we evaluate whether excess capacity in manufactured goods is a systemic threat to the world trading system.
The impact of crisis-era trade distortions on exports from the European Union
Having grown in real terms by 60% between 2000 to 2008, extra-EU exports have since stagnated. Stripping out other determinants of EU export growth, the focus here is on the impact of trade distortions imposed by foreign governments since the global economic crisis began.
Our econometric analysis implies that crisis-era trade distortions held back EU Member State export growth to destinations outside of the EU by between 10-20 percentage points between 2008 and 2014. We estimate that the EU export growth deficit compared to China (amounting to on average 35 percentage points from 2008 to 2014) would have been halved in the absence of foreign trade distortions.
The 21st Global Trade Alert Report
Not since the London Summit of in April 2009 has protectionism had such a high profile in the run-up to a G20 Leader’s Summit. President Trump’s America First policies have drawn sharp criticism from leaders of other G20 governments. Accusations and counter-accusations of unfair trading practices have become a regular occurrence. So as to shed light on competing claims, this Global Trade Alert report documents the actions taken by G20 governments through to the end of June 2017.
The 20th Global Trade Alert Report
As global trade continues to stagnate, the spotlight has shifted during China’s G20 Presidency to foreign direct investment (FDI).Two recent developments have brought FDI to the forefront of international policy deliberations. First, at their annual meeting in July 2016, G20 trade ministers endorsed nine G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking. Second, in June 2016 UNCTAD published its flagship annual World Investment Report showing that FDI flows “soared” in 2015 to its highest level since the onset of the global economic crisis. This report – released in advance of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Hangzhou, China – critically evaluates the recovery of FDI, the G20’s contribution to that recovery, the coherence of G20 trade and investment policymaking to date, and ultimately, the new G20 Guiding Principles.
The 19th Global Trade Alert Report
This report demonstrates that talk of a global trade slowdown is misplaced. Since January 2015 world trade volumes have plateaued, which is unusual as pauses in trade growth are typically associated with global recessions. A global trade plateau is a major source of concern as it is likely to add to the temptation of governments to engage in zero-sum commercial policies that seek to steal market share from foreign rivals.
The 18th Global Trade Alert Report
The Tide Turns? Trade, Protectionism, and Slowing Global Growth
The G20’s principal task of reviving global economic growth has never been easy – it is harder now that world trade is contracting. World trade growth isn’t slowing down – the latest available monthly data compiled for this report suggests that it has been falling in volume and value terms through 2015. On average G20 exports have fallen 4.5% since world trade peaked in value in October 2014.
The 17th GTA report
BRICS Trade Strategy: Time for a Rethink
The term BRICS was coined by Jim O’Neill from Goldman Sachs over a decade ago. Unlike many acronyms, this one has stuck - largely because of the growing share of the world economy associated with the emerging economic powers Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa (the latter being added somewhat later.) With the greater global footprint, the policy choices of these countries matter more.
How Foreign Trade Distortions Slowed LDC Export-Led Growth
This new eBook argues that least developed countries were hard hit by these barriers. Drawing on Global Trade Alert data, it argues that these barriers reduced these nations’ exports by 30% during the period 2009 to 2013 – over a quarter of a trillion US dollars in total.
The 16th Global Trade Alert Report
Based on a massive data collection effort since the St. Petersburg G20 summit last September, in which a further 2,001 trade-related state initiatives have been documented, this report demonstrates that the resort to protectionism has been substantially higher than previously thought.
The 15th Global Trade Alert Report
Beggar-Thy-Poor-Neighbour: Crisis-Era Protectionism and Developing Countries
The most vulnerable trading Nations on Earth - the Least Developed Countries and Countries from Sub-Saharan Africa- have long been encouraged by Western donors, international development Organisations and economists to integrate their economies into world markets.This volume examines the extent to which such integration was frustrated by protectionism measures taking since the onset on Greta Recession.
The 14th Global Trade Alert Report
What Restraint? Five Years of G20 Pledges on Trade
For the past five years, leaders of the G20 countries have said they would not implement new trade restrictions, WTO-inconsistent export subsidies, or export taxes and quotas. They also promised to "roll back" any crisis-era protectionism that was imposed. Drawing upon nearly 3,800 separate reports of trade-related government measures collected and published by the Global Trade Alert team, this Report contains the most up-to-date and comprehensive assessment of adherence to the G20's "standstill" on protectionism. At a time when the World Trade Organization is in the doldrums, the performance of this non-binding alternative to intergovernmental cooperation on commercial policies takes on greater significance.
The 13th Global Trade Alert Report
Not Just Victims: Latin America and Crisis-Era Protectionism - The 13th GTA Report
The global economic crisis that began to unfold in 2007 hit Latin America hard, slowing down economic growth considerably. The 13th Report from Global Trade Alert shows that Latin America has not just been a victim of protectionism imposed by other parts of the world, as some policymakers and commentators assert.
The 12th Global Trade Alert Report
Given that the current holder of this year’s G8 Presidency, the UK, has made combatting protectionism a priority, the 12th GTA report has been compiled and released just before the G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, on 17-18 June 2013. Concerns about protectionism are not confined to the UK, however. In April 2013, when introducing reduced forecasts for world trade growth, the Director-General of the WTO, Mr. Pascal Lamy, warned that the protectionist threat may be greater now than at any time since the onset of the global economic crisis. On the basis of the evidence presented here, Mr Lamy’s concerns were well founded.
The 11th Global Trade Alert Report
The 11th Global Trade Alert report on protectionism--assembled by an independent team of trade policy analysts from around the world--provides a detailed account of the resort to beggar-thy-neighbour policies from the first crisis-era G20 summit in November 2008 until May 2012.
The 10th Global Trade Alert Report
The threats to an open trading system mounted in the second half of 2011 for several reasons.
The 9th Global Trade Alert Report
Resolve Falters As Global Prospects Worsen
In 2011 the world economy has been buffeted by a number of developments that were not foreseen at the time of the Seoul G20 Summit. These unanticipated, adverse macroeconomic developments now coincide with election cycles and political leadership transition cycles in a number of jurisdictions, increasing the risk that some political leaders will court short-term popularity by resorting to protectionism. Moreover, now that many governments are cutting government budgets and interest rates cannot fall much further in many countries, restricting foreign competition is one of the few tools available to policymakers when responding to pleas from domestic firms and trade unions. The sooner global economic growth recovers its previous pace the better. One welcome side effect would be taking the some of the wind out of the protectionist sails.
The 8th Global Trade Alert Report
Although the dispute over China's exchange rate regime intensified in the run-up to the Seoul G20 Summit, pressures for across-the-board protectionist measures have been contained, for now. The latest data on protectionism, summarised in this Report, show that the countries with large current account surpluses have not been targeted unduly in recent months.
The 7th Global Trade Alert Report
Managed Exports and the Recovery of World Trade
The Seventh Report of the Global Trade Alert, drawing upon over 1200 investigations of state measures, reveals that while 2010 has seen a substantial recovery in world trade, governments have continued to discriminate against foreign commercial interests. Moreover, recovery does not seem to have affected the rate at which governments resort to protectionist measures. One reaction to this finding is to argue that the discrimination cannot be that significant if world trade is recovering so quickly.
The 6th Global Trade Alert Report
This Report of the Global Trade Alert, published to coincide with the Toronto G-20 Leaders' Summit in June 2010, presents a comprehensive global overview of protectionist trends since the last G-20 summit in September 2009. It draws upon a substantial expansion in the evidence collected by the GTA team during 2010 on the measures announced and implemented by governments since November 2008.
The 5th Global Trade Alert Report
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation
With the return to economic growth of many industrialised economies in either late 2009 or the first half of 2010, combined with sustained expansions in the emerging market economies, came the hope that protectionist pressures would ease in the world economy through 2010. If anything, the period since our last report was published in January 2010 has been one of the busiest for the Global Trade Alert team.
The 4th Global Trade Alert Report
Will Stabilisation Limit Protectionism?
After the tumult of the first half of 2009 many economies stabilised and some even began to recover in the last quarter of 2009. Using information compiled through to late January 2010, this the fourth report of the Global Trade Alert examines whether macroeconomic stabilisation has altered governments resort to protectionism.
The 3rd Global Trade Alert Report
The Unrelenting Pressure of Protectionism
At a time when more commentators are becoming cautiously optimistic about the prospects for 2010, this Report from Global Trade Alert presents the latest data on the protectionist dynamics at work since the first G20 crisis-related Summit in November 2008 and highlights the many anti-trade measures that are in the pipeline.
The 2nd Global Trade Alert Report
The second GTA report, prepared by an independent group of researchers and analysts located around the globe, is based on over 400 investigations of state measures that have been implemented since the first crisis-related G20 meeting in November 2008.
Global Trade Alert, first launched on 8 June 2009, has been in operation for a month. Experts from every region of the world are now contributing to this initiative. However, rather than rush to judgement about the implications for foreign commercial interests of the state measures taken since the first crisis-related G20 meeting last November, this GTA report describes our findings to date and explains the procedures GTA follows. In doing so the GTA’s value-added and complementarity with existing monitoring initiatives will be established.
