In June 2015, the government of the United States of America announced changes to its trade defence rules.



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Inception date: 29 Jun 2015 | Removal date: open ended


As part of a bill on general trade preferences, the US implemented changes to its trade defense processes in mid-2015.
On June 29, 2015 President Obama signed into law a bill entitled the "Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015" (designated H.R.1295). While the main focus of the legislation the renewal of expired preferential trade programs, it was also treated as a vehicle for the enactment of several other trade-related items.
One of these is entitled the "American Trade Enforcement Effectiveness Act" (Title V of the bill), which makes numerous procedural changes in the operation of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws and codifies into law several aspects of that have become matters of practice in the U.S. International Trade Commission and the International Trade Administration.
The structure of this legislation does not make clear which of the provisions reflect the codification of existing practices and which represent new developments, but the overall thrust of the legislation leans in favor of petitioners rather than respondents.
One of the more significant provisions, for example, states that the U.S. International Trade Commission may not determine that there is no material injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry from imports merely because that industry is profitable or its performance has recently improved.
Other provisions include the following:
The administering authorities are not required to determine, or make any adjustments to, a countervailable subsidy rate or weighted average dumping margin based on any assumptions about information the interested party would have provided if it had complied with a request for information.
The administering authorities, when relying during an AD or CVD proceeding on secondary information rather than on information obtained in the course of an investigation or review, shall not be required to corroborate any dumping margin or CVD in a separate segment of the same proceeding.
The administering authority may use a countervailable subsidy rate or dumping margin meeting specified criteria, including the highest rate or margin, when making an inference adverse to a party's interests.
The USITC, in determining market share and the factors affecting financial performance when domestic producers internally transfer significant production of the domestic like product for the production of a downstream article and sell significant production of the domestic like product in the merchant market, may no longer need to find that the production of the domestic like product sold in the merchant market is not generally used in the production of that downstream article.
The administering authority shall consider to be outside the ordinary course of trade any particular market situation that prevents a proper comparison with the export price or constructed export price.
This bill revises requirements regarding administering authority determinations as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that a foreign like product is being sold at less than cost of production in AD investigations or reviews. Information supplied by an interested party, based upon observed prices or constructed prices or costs, may no longer constitute a reasonable ground to believe or suspect such a sales condition.
The administering authority in making its determinations, however, shall request information necessary to calculate the constructed value and cost of production of subject merchandise in such investigations or reviews. Certain factors are specified for the administering authority to consider when deciding whether it would be unduly burdensome in CVD or AD investigations and reviews to examine voluntary responses from exporters or producers which are not the subjects of the investigation or review.